

Paweł Mąkosa
John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Poland
ORCID: 0000-0002-4664-7024

Poland between emigration and immigration in an ecclesial context

Poland is associated primarily as a source of migration, as Polish diasporas are scattered all over the world. In recent years, the country has also become a place of settlement for refugees and migrants coming in particular from Eastern Europe. This paper aims to discuss the migratory situation in Poland in relation to the teaching of the Roman Catholic Church. We will start with presentation of current emigration from Poland, followed by the influx of foreigners to this country. The effects of emigration on the country of emigration will also be demonstrated. The subsequent subject of our analysis will be the teaching of the Church regarding emigrants, especially care for their spiritual well-being. The second part of the article will be devoted to immigration to Poland. The reflection will end with presentation of current data on the number of immigrants and the reasons for settling in Poland. We will begin with demonstrating the Polish state policy in this regard, to move on to the position of the Roman Catholic Church, as regards the acceptance of refugees and migrants.

1. The scale and cause of emigration from Poland after 2004

Since the beginning of membership in the European Union in 2004, Poles were able to work legally in the United Kingdom, Republic of Ireland and Sweden. Then, on 1 May 2006, Spain, Portugal, Finland, Greece, Iceland opened such a possibility, joined by Italy in July of the same year. Soon the Netherlands and Luxembourg (May 2007) and France (July 2008) joined the group of these countries. Belgium, Denmark and Norway (not a member of the EU) opened their labour markets on 1 May 2009. The last countries, taking advantage of the full seven-year transition period (ending on 1 May 2011), were Germany and Austria. They were joined by Switzerland, which is not a member of the European Union, but has numerous agreements with it¹.

At the beginning of EU membership, Poles most often emigrated to such countries as: United Kingdom, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Austria, Norway, Sweden, and France². According to data from 2007, which is a kind of apogee of migration, there were 2 million 270 thousand Poles staying abroad, including 1 860 000 in European Union countries³. Data based on the personal contact of priests with the inhabitants of their parishes, especially during pastoral visits, demonstrated that in 2014 the number of Poles who were registered in all Polish parishes but actually went abroad amounted to almost 2.7 million⁴. It must therefore be acknowledged that "international migrations are a socio-economic phenomenon permanently inscribed in contemporary Polish history⁵."

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¹ W. Danilewicz, Wybrane cechy i strategie poakcesyjnych migracji z Polski, *Warmińsko-Mazurski Kwartalnik Naukowy, Nauki Społeczne*, 1 (2012.) 1, p. 37.

² Centrum Badań Opinii Społecznej, *Praca Polaków w krajach UE. Komunikat z badań*, CBOS, Warszawa 2006.

³ Główny Urząd Statystyczny. Departament Badań Demograficznych i Rynku Pracy, *Informacja o rozmiarach i kierunkach czasowej emigracji z Polski w latach 2004 – 2013*, GUS, Warszawa 2014, p. 3.

⁴ Instytut Statystyki Kościoła Katolickiego, *Annuario Statisticum Ecclesiae in Polonia ad 2015*, ISKK, Warszawa 2015, p. 4.

⁵ Główny Urząd Statystyczny. Departament Badań Demograficznych i Rynku Pracy, *Informacja o rozmiarach i kierunkach czasowej emigracji z Polski w latach 2004 – 2013*, GUS, Warszawa 2014, p. 1.

Poles leave their homeland mainly for economic reasons. The most common reason is their subjective belief that there are no life prospects here (53.8%) and the higher earnings and higher standard of living (45.2%) expected on emigration. A large percentage of Poles also indicate their willingness to learn a foreign language, learn about the world and gain experience (44.2%). For some (17.7%), the migration was caused by a coincidence. Every tenth young Pole (9.9%) also talks about wanting to get education abroad⁶.

2. Effects of emigration from Poland

Population migrations have serious consequences, but not only those limited to the personal sphere. Their effects on family life and also, due to the large scale of the phenomenon, on entire communities are also very clear⁷. Certainly the positive effect of migration is overcoming unemployment, which is the cause of the poor economic situation and, especially in men, significantly affects low self-esteem⁸. Therefore, taking up a job abroad is usually a positive qualitative change for migrants and their family. Learning a foreign language or foreign culture can also be listed as the positive effects of leaving Poland.

In economic terms, the main beneficiary of migration is primarily the destination country, due to the fact that migrants fill the gaps in its labour market, contribute to increasing GDP and help it overcome demographic crisis, which has taken dramatic proportions in almost all of Europe⁹. The benefits for the country of origin are not so obvious. On the one hand, migrants send money to the country of emigration, thus helping their families and friends, or invest with the intention of returning to their homeland. Nevertheless the country of origin also experiences population decline and lack of manpower in the local market. This applies especially to qualified and even above average gifted persons, because it is widely known that *brain drain*¹⁰ consists in proposing such working conditions abroad, to those, who are talented and qualified, that they leave their country of origin on a mass scale.

It is also worth mentioning that the transfer of money to families in Poland can have negative consequences too. On the one hand, it increases the risk of using drugs and stimulants, on the other hand, people who receive money from abroad can give up or limit their professional activity. Such situations lead to economic problems in the scale of the country or region¹¹.

One of the most significant issues caused by migration is the so-called Euro-orphanage, i.e. total or partial orphaning of children by parents staying abroad. The extent of this phenomenon in Poland is very large, e.g. in 2009 it concerned some 150,000 Euro-orphans¹². This problem is multifaceted, but undoubtedly destructive for children and

⁶ M. Budnik, Uwagi o współczesnej emigracji Polaków (2004–2008), *Przegląd Polsko-Polonijny*, 3(2012.) 1, p. 209; R. Bera, *Aksjologiczny sens pracy a poczucie jakości życia młodych emigrantów polskich*, UMCS, Lublin 2008, pp. 103–105.

⁷ B. Solga, Miejsce i znaczenie migracji zagranicznych w rozwoju regionalnym, *Studia Ekonomiczne. Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Katowicach*, 309 (2017.) 1, p. 158 et seq.

⁸ See. P. Kaczmarczyk, *Współczesne migracje zagraniczne Polaków – skala, struktura oraz potencjalne skutki dla rynku pracy*, Polish-American Freedom Foundation, Warszawa 2006, p. 14.

⁹ Cf. M. Kluz, Człowiek w konfrontacji ze współczesną emigracją zarobkową, *Studia Sandomierskie*, 20 (2013), nr 2, p. 127.

¹⁰ See. C. Teney, *Introduction*, in: *Brain Drain – Brain Gain: European Labour Markets in Times of Crisis*, A. Schellinger (ed.), Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bonn 2015, p. 5.

¹¹ K. Iglicka, *Bilans kosztów i korzyści najnowszej fali migracji zarobkowych z Polski oraz konsekwencje tego odpływu*, in: *Migracje zagraniczne a polityka rodzinna*, J. Szymborski, A. Potrykowska (eds.), RPO, Warszawa 2009, p. 50.

¹² *Ibid*, p. 49. See. B. Walczak, *Społeczne, edukacyjne i wychowawcze konsekwencje migracji rodziców i opiekunów prawnych uczniów szkół podstawowych, gimnazjalnych i ponadgimnazjalnych*, Pedagogium, Warszawa 2008.

adolescents growing up without parents, or with only one of them. Experts argue that in the absence of a parent lasting more than 6 months, especially during adolescence, children develop problem behaviours such as truancy, use of stimulants, etc. Mental disorders such as anxiety and depression are also noticeable¹³.

In the context of the present publication, it should be noted that migration also affects religious and moral life, and most often it does so adversely. Due to work on Sunday, limited access to pastoral care in Polish, lack of social impact, migrants neglect to participate in religious practices of their own religious community¹⁴. This problem was noticed by the Second Polish Plenary Synod, which described migration as income-driven separation, having a degrading effect on the family¹⁵. Emigrants rarely attend Sunday Mass, stating the lack of a local Catholic church and unfamiliarity with the local language as the main reasons for that. The weakening of religiosity has consequences not only in the individual, but also in the family and social spheres¹⁶. There is also a noticeable phenomenon called the *moral hazard problem*, involving the establishment of extramarital relationships, alcohol abuse, drug use or gambling addictions.

3. Contemporary teaching of the Church on the subject of Polish emigration

The Church in Poland spoke about emigration on numerous occasions. The Second Polish Plenary Synod elaborated a document entitled "Polish Pastoral Care Abroad"¹⁷ containing the theological view of the phenomenon of emigration, description of the pastoral care of emigration as well as practical regulations and guidelines¹⁸. Bishops noted that Poland has been a source of migration for over two centuries and defined its causes as economic, ideological and political¹⁹. Then they recall the biblical basics of hospitality and care for migrants and emphasize the need for pastoral care in Polish while maintaining Polish customs. At the same time, they appeal for cooperation with the local Church as well as for the evangelization of local communities. Polish bishops also warn against separation, especially lasting for many years, leading to breaking up marriages and families. They also pay attention to serious challenges regarding the upbringing of the young generation of Poles²⁰.

The Polish Bishops' Conference, the Primate of Poland and the PBC Delegate for Emigration dealt with Poles in exile in many letters, appeals and speeches. The *Letter of the Polish Episcopate on the Pastoral Care of Emigration* of 2006, in which an appeal was made to Poles abroad to preserve "the attitude of a Christian, Catholic and Polish, aware of his dignity and duties in religiously indifferent and even anti-Christian environments"²¹ is just one example. Polish bishops pointed to great opportunities to participate in Polish-language

¹³ B. Boćwińska-Kulik, *Przeżycia dzieci migrantów – głos z gabinetu psychoterapeutycznego*, in: *Procesy migracji w społeczeństwie otwartym. Perspektywa edukacji międzykulturowej*, J. Nikitorowicz, D. Misiejuk (eds.), Trans Humana, Białystok 2009, pp. 351, 358.

¹⁴ E. Daszkowska, *Emigracja Polaków po 2004 roku i jej skutki*, Amicus Europae, Warszawa 2014, p. 9.

¹⁵ *II Polski Synod Plenarny (1991–1999)*, Pallotinum, Poznań 2001, p. 38.

¹⁶ M. Kluz, Człowiek w konfrontacji ze współczesną emigracją zarobkową, *Studia Sandomierskie*, 20 (2013), nr 2, p. 129.

¹⁷ *II Polski Synod Plenarny (1991–1999)*, Pallotinum, Poznań 2001, pp. 251-262.

¹⁸ See. A. Orczykowski, Problemy emigracji w uchwałach II Polskiego Synodu Plenarnego, *Prawo Kanoniczne. Kwartalnik prawno-historyczny*, 46 (2003), 1-2, pp. 57-89; P. Mąkosza, *Geneza i perspektywy duszpasterstwa Polaków w warunkach emigracji*, in: *Kościół. Komunia i dialog*, P. Kantyka, J. Czerkawski, T. Siemieniec (eds.), Jedność, Kielce 2014, p. 399.

¹⁹ *II Polski Synod Plenarny (1991-1999)*, Pallotinum, Poznań 2001, p. 243.

²⁰ *Ibid*, pp. 246-247.

²¹ Konferencja Episkopatu Polski, *List o emigracji*, KEP, Warszawa 2006.

pastoral work and called for mutual solidarity and deepening patriotism during their emigration.

Another significant manifestation of concern for Polish emigrants are the 2019 *Guidelines of the Polish Bishops' Conference regarding the pastoral care of Polish emigrants*²². This document was divided into three parts: *Organization of pastoral ministry, People involved in Polish-language pastoral ministry, Basic pastoral functions*. In the first part, the authors discuss the structures of pastoral care of Polish emigrants, paying special attention to the role of the coordinator (rector) of pastors in Polish.

The second part of the document describes the role of individual categories of people involved in the pastoral care of immigrants, i.e. diocesan priests, members of institutes of consecrated life and associations of apostolic life, and also lay people. The last part of the guidelines concern pastoral functions such as the ministry of the word, sacramental and liturgical ministry and the ministry of pastoral love. It is worth noting that the Polish Bishops' Conference imposes the obligation to conduct systematic catechesis for children and youth at all levels of education on Polish pastoral centres²³. At the same time, it is postulated that preparation for the sacraments should be carried out "in accordance with the practice in force in the Church in Poland²⁴." What is particularly visible in the teaching of the Church on the emigration of Poles, is the concern for the faith and religious development of emigrants. For this reason, the Church coordinates the pastoral care of immigrants wherever necessary.

4. The current number of immigrants in Poland

When it comes to immigration, Poland was a shelter for many European residents as early as the 16th century, especially during religious wars following the Reformation. Later, however, there was no significant immigration to Poland due to its difficult fate. For several years, however, there has been a massive influx of Ukrainians and, albeit much smaller, citizens of countries such as Belarus, India, Georgia and Vietnam²⁵.

The number of immigrants who have the right to reside in Poland has increased from around 175,000 in 2015, up to 212,000 in 2016, 266,000 in 2017, over 325,000 in 2018 to 382,000 today²⁶. The number of registered employees from Ukraine has increased thirteen times since 2014, and Belarusians and Moldovans - six times²⁷. Some estimate the Ukrainian citizens currently residing in Poland at no less than 800,000 people and this group is still subject to dynamic growth²⁸. Undoubtedly, their number has reached a historic record. The fact is that in Cracow alone, over two thousand Ukrainian children attend primary schools. Cracow was the first Polish city to introduce four hours of Ukrainian in selected schools²⁹.

²² Konferencja Episkopatu Polski, *Wytyczne Konferencji Episkopatu Polski dotyczące duszpasterstwa emigracji polskiej*, Biblos, Tarnów 2019.

²³ Ibid, p. 31.

²⁴ Ibid, p. 33.

²⁵ Urząd do spraw Cudzoziemców, *Przyrost liczby cudzoziemców*, on-line, <https://udsc.gov.pl/statystyki/raporty-okresowe/raport-roczny-legalizacja-pobytu/2018-2/> (10.07.2019).

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Z. Bartuś, *Ukraińcy zostaną Polakami*, on-line, <https://dziennikpolski24.pl/ukraincy-zostana-polakami-ilu-milion-dwa-miliony-wszystko-zalezy-od-sytuacji-na-wschodzie-oraz-polityki-polskiego-rzadu-i/ar/c3-14145441> (10.07.2019).

²⁸ M. Jaroszewicz, O. Małynowska, *Najnowsza migracja z Ukrainy do Polski: (nie)stały fenomen?* Fundacja Batorego, Warszawa 2018, p. 3.

²⁹ Z. Bartuś, *Ukraińcy zostaną Polakami*, on-line, <https://dziennikpolski24.pl/ukraincy-zostana-polakami-ilu-milion-dwa-miliony-wszystko-zalezy-od-sytuacji-na-wschodzie-oraz-polityki-polskiego-rzadu-i/ar/c3-14145441> (10.07.2019).

The inflow of foreigners to Cracow's universities is even faster - in some fields (especially economics) Ukrainians themselves can constitute even one third of students³⁰.

The mass influx of immigrants from Ukraine took place after 2014, i.e. since the outbreak of the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine. The introduction of new regulations in 2014, was also not without significance - the new Act on foreigners³¹ contains some simplifications in the area of legalization of stay in Poland, especially for people of Polish origin. Poland issued over a million of Pole's Cards to Ukrainians. This means that after just a year they can become Polish citizens³².

According to experts, the current wave of Ukrainian migration to Poland would most likely not have happened had it not been for the rapid deterioration of the economic situation and security of Ukrainians in the result of the Russian annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of the unresolved conflict in eastern Ukraine. The main reason for the increased influx of Ukrainian migrants to Poland was the significant increase in the pay gap between Poland and Ukraine in the light of a sharp deterioration in living standards³³. Including inflation, the Ukrainian GDP shrank by more than 16%³⁴. The conflict in Eastern Ukraine also caused the phenomenon of re-orientation of some of the Ukrainian migrants from the Russian to the Polish market³⁵.

Geographical location and cultural closeness with Ukraine, well-developed networks of migration connections, and finally specific solutions in the sphere of migration policy are also of great importance³⁶.

The so-called a system of declarations, under which it is permissible to entrust work to a foreigner, without the need to obtain a work permit, for a period not exceeding six months during the subsequent twelve months, plays a special role here in attracting Ukrainian citizens. In practice, this means that the residents of Ukraine could, with a minimum of formalities and financial expenses, be entitled to legal, short-term work in Poland³⁷.

The reasons for the mass emigration of Ukrainians to Poland are also low travel costs, lack of major language barriers, as well as very extensive Ukrainian migration networks in Poland. One of the terms that characterize Ukrainian migration to Poland is the term "local mobility", which means circular migration benefiting from geographical, cultural and linguistic proximity³⁸.

Poland is increasingly becoming the destination country for migration from the East for the following reasons:

1. Poland is one of the most dynamically developing countries with high economic potential.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ *Ustawa z dnia 12 grudnia 2013 roku o cudzoziemcach*, Dz. U. z 2013 roku, poz. 1650.

³² Z. Bartuś, *Ukraińcy zostaną Polakami*, on-line, <https://dziennikpolski24.pl/ukraincy-zostana-polakami-ilu-milion-dwa-miliony-wszystko-zalezy-od-sytuacji-na-wschodzie-oraz-polityki-polskiego-rzadu-i/ar/c3-14145441> (10.07.2019).

³³ M. Jaroszewicz, O. Małynowska, *Najnowsza migracja z Ukrainy do Polski: (nie)stały fenomen?* Fundacja Batorego, Warszawa 2018, p. 2.

³⁴ World Bank, *Ukraine Systematic Country Diagnostic. Towards Sustainable Recovery and Shared Prosperity*, World Bank Group, Washington D.C., 2017.

³⁵ M. Jaroszewicz, O. Małynowska, *Najnowsza migracja z Ukrainy do Polski: (nie)stały fenomen?* Fundacja Batorego, Warszawa 2018, p. 2.

³⁶ A. Górny, P. Kaczmarczyk, M. Szulecka, M. Bitner, M. Okólski, U. Siedlecka, A. Stefańczak, *Imigranci w Polsce w kontekście uproszczonej procedury zatrudniania cudzoziemców*, Uniwersytet Warszawski, Warszawa 2018, p. 24.

³⁷ M. Jaroszewicz, O. Małynowska, *Najnowsza migracja z Ukrainy do Polski: (nie)stały fenomen?* Fundacja Batorego, Warszawa 2018, p. 2.

³⁸ Ibid, p. 3.

2. Limiting mobility barriers, including Poland's admission to the Schengen area, gave foreigners, who come to our country for medium- and long-term stays a chance to move freely within this zone and conduct various activities.

3. With the accession in EU, Poland's attractiveness in receiving foreigners significantly increased not only as a transit country, but also as a place of education, employment and country of settlement.

4. Mass post-accession emigration of Poles has contributed to changes on the Polish labor market, resulting in unsatisfied labor demand, especially in professions belonging to the so-called a secondary labor market sector³⁹.

As many as 76.9 percent of immigrants coming to Poland from outside the European Union do work, which is one of the highest rates in Europe.⁴⁰ At present, Poland has the fastest growing population of economic migrants in the EU and it can be assumed that their number will continue to grow⁴¹.

5. Polish state immigration policy

There is a widespread belief that the Polish state is not favourable towards refugees and migrants. But it is only partially true. The previous Polish government, in accordance with the decision of the EU Council of 22 September 2015, agreed to admit a total of 14,369 people, mainly from Greece and Italy. The current Polish government has decided to honour the commitments of its predecessors in this matter, however, set conditions that concerned the verification of migrants, checking their true identity, and added the possibility of selecting migrants, who will be admitted in Poland.

The planned relocation did not take place, however, for many reasons, mainly political. The fact is that at the beginning of 2016 a single Syrian family (6 people) was qualified for resettlement, but it refused to come to Poland⁴².

At present, however, the Polish state does not agree with the forced relocation of refugees. Already in 2015, Polish President Andrzej Duda officially disagreed with the imposition of so-called quota system on the reception of refugees for member states. In his opinion, this should be implemented, as far as possible, by individual member states, and not imposed by EU institutions. The president took the position of resolving the refugee crisis "at source", by creating the right conditions in refugee camps in the Middle East, and helping countries at war. In 2016, the Polish Sejm supported the idea of bringing and financing humanitarian aid in conflict areas and neighbouring countries⁴³. That is why the Polish state aids people where conflicts and wars take place. An example is the aid provided to the inhabitants of Aleppo in Syria.

The opposition to the mechanism of forced relocation of migrants to EU member states is justified on the one hand by concern for the security of citizens, especially in the context of terrorist attacks, but also by the reluctance of migrants to settle in Poland. The position of the Polish government also stems from public opinion. As results of January 2016

³⁹ Zespół do spraw migracji, *Polityka migracyjna Polski*, Departament Analiz i Polityki Migracyjnej MSWiA, Warszawa 2019, p. 6.

⁴⁰ J. Frączyk, *Ściągamy najbardziej pracowitych imigrantów w Europie*, on-line <https://www.money.pl/gospodarka/sciagamy-najbardziej-pracowitych-imigrantow-w-europie-co-piaty-na-samozatrudnieniu-6389386907424897a.html> (10.07.2019).

⁴¹ Zespół do spraw migracji, *Polityka migracyjna Polski*, Departament Analiz i Polityki Migracyjnej MSWiA, Warszawa 2019, p. 6.

⁴² A. Adamczyk, *Polska wobec kryzysu migracyjnego*, in. *Polityczne i społeczne aspekty wielokulturowości. Migracje i mniejszości*, ed. A. Adamczyk, A. Sakson, C. Trosiak, UAM, Poznań 2016, p. 99.

⁴³ Ibid, pp. 101-102; 105.

opinion polls demonstrated, only 4% of Poles were in favor of admitting migrants. Far more people, 36%, were in favour of accepting refugees, but for a limited period only⁴⁴.

It must be stated that Poland is not a destination country for refugees and migrants from Asia and Africa due to low social benefits and lack of migration networks. Most often they wish to settle in Germany, Sweden or Great Britain, where many of their compatriots already live and where they can receive broader social assistance, and the standard of living is also higher. Polish authorities argue that if forced relocation to Poland would occur, migrants should be placed in special centers and de facto deprived of their freedom, which is contrary to human rights and international law. This position is grounded in practice. In 2015, the Esera Foundation brought 150 Christians from Syria to Poland, and almost all of them left Poland heading to Germany⁴⁵ shortly afterwards. Similar situations occurred in relation to people who were helped by the Roman Catholic Church. Refugees and migrants from the Middle East do not want to live in Poland and opt for Germany as the country of residence. Therefore, it is difficult to force them to settle in this country.

At the same time, the Polish state has an open migration policy, but it is mainly concerns migrants from Eastern Europe. What is noteworthy here, are actions initiated for Poles who, at the end of World War II, were in the territory of the Soviet Union or their descendants⁴⁶. The demographic structure of Poland and the retirement of the baby boomers generation caused shortage of labour. It is estimated that in the years 2015-2020 the available workforce will decrease by nearly 590 thousand and this process will further intensify in subsequent years. In total, by 2030, workforce resources will decrease by over 1.5 million people⁴⁷. This, in connection with development of Polish economy, resulted in historically low unemployment rate (of approx. 5-6%) and high demand for migrants' work. To sum up, Polish migration policy can be characterized as focused primarily on the short-term needs of the labour market⁴⁸.

At the same time, as a EU border country, Poland very carefully verifies those crossing the border and attempts to counteract illegal immigration. 54 thousand non-EU residents were refused to cross the Polish border, which at the same time constitutes the external EU border (just to compare - France 70 thousand, and Spain 230)⁴⁹.

6. Teaching and activities of the Polish Roman Catholic Church for the benefit of migrants

The Roman Catholic Church in Poland, which is the dominant religious community, has repeatedly spoken about refugee and migrant matters and undertook specific actions for their benefit. The position of the Church in Poland does not differ from that of Pope Francis, but is different from the position of the government. Generally, the teaching is based on the position of the Church elaborated in the 1990's, during the pontificate of the Polish Pope, John Paul II⁵⁰.

⁴⁴ Ibid, p. 108.

⁴⁵ I. Kacprzak, *Syryjczycy nie chcą być uchodźcami w Polsce*, on-line, <https://www.rp.pl/Uchodzcy/303289891-Syryjczycy-nie-chca-byc-uchodzcyami-w-Polsce.html> (10.07.2019).

⁴⁶ Zespół do spraw migracji, *Polityka migracyjna Polski*, Departament Analiz i Polityki Migracyjnej MSWiA, Warszawa 2019, p. 7.

⁴⁷ Ibid, s. 3.

⁴⁸ M. Jaroszewicz, O. Małynowska, *Najnowsza migracja z Ukrainy do Polski: (nie)stały fenomen?* Fundacja Batorego, Warszawa 2018, p. 2.

⁴⁹ J. Bereźnicki, *Polska odprawia z kwitkiem tysiące imigrantów, ale tylu pozwoleń na pobyt nie wydaje nikt inny w UE*, on-line, <https://spidersweb.pl/bizblog/imigracja-polska-ue-ukraincy-pozwolenia-pobyt-prace/> (10.07.2019).

⁵⁰ P. Stachowiak, *Kilka uwag o paradoksach polskiego katolicyzmu. Na marginesie narracji Kościoła katolickiego w Polsce o kwestii uchodźczej*, in: *Polityczne i społeczne aspekty wielokulturowości. Migracje i mniejszości*, ed. A. Adamczyk, A. Sakson, C. Trosiak, UAM, Poznań 2016, p. 141.

The Presidium of the Polish Bishops' Conference in its position of 8 September 2015 presented its view in three points⁵¹:

1) "The main effort of the world should be aimed at extinguishing conflicts, in the result of which people are forced to save themselves by fleeing their own country. It is therefore necessary to help those who suffer from wars in their countries of origin;"

2) "When it comes to specific assistance to refugees in Poland, there is no doubt that the main initiative and responsibility rests on the shoulders of secular authorities. They are the inviting party.

They should also guarantee control, security and basic benefits for refugees in this respect;"

3) "The Roman Catholic Church of Poland [...] will do everything in its power for refugees, to ease their dramatic situation. We shall not forget that we ourselves were refugees and guests in foreign countries too, and ultimately we are only "guests" on this Earth⁵²."

Cardinal Kazimierz Nycz, Archbishop of Warsaw, said that Poles cannot leave refugees without help. In his opinion, one should help everyone, but help cautiously, prudently, fairly and develop cooperation between three entities - the state, local government, and the NGOs⁵³.

The chairman of the Polish Bishops' Conference, Archbishop Stanisław Gądecki, in reference to the appeal by Pope Francis, appealed to each parish to prepare places for refugees: "today is the time for a real trial of our Christianity. It is necessary for every parish that can afford it to prepare for the reception of refugees and help them start a new life."⁵⁴

A very clear position on the issue of refugees and migrants is contained in the communication of the Council of the Polish Bishops' Conference on Migration, Tourism and Pilgrimages. It points to the analogy of the fate of Polish refugees and migrants with the fate of those coming to Europe today: "In the face of the aversion to foreigners, sometimes towards Poles in exile, and against the backdrop of extremely painful images of refugees from Africa asking for help at the borders of Europe - Christ's words about the blessed are more clearly heard and understood, because "I was a stranger and you welcomed me". The subsequent words are also real, full of threat: "Go away from me, cursed [...], because I was a stranger and you did not receive me⁵⁵."

It is worth noting that the quoted statements of Church representatives in Poland lack any fear of losing Poland's cultural or religious identity!⁵⁶ Admittedly, there are statements of individual bishops saying that "it would be much more rational to accept Christians, because despite all cultural differences we have a common ontological basis with them⁵⁷."

At the same time, however, it should be noted that the voice of the Church hierarchy calling for the reception of refugees and migrants is widely contested in the Polish society.

⁵¹ Ibid, p. 142.

⁵² Prezydium Konferencji Episkopatu Polski, Komunikat w sprawie uchodźców, *Niedziela*, 38 (2015), p. 10.

⁵³ A. Adamczyk, *Polska wobec kryzysu migracyjnego*, in: *Polityczne i społeczne aspekty wielokulturowości. Migracje i mniejszości*, ed. A. Adamczyk, A. Sakson, C. Trościak, UAM, Poznań 2016, p. 112.

⁵⁴ S. Gądecki, *Dzisiaj nadszedł dla nas czas prawdziwej próby z naszego chrześcijaństwa*, on-line, <https://www.gloria.tv/article/VjLm7dHog9DN3LkK2aY8mPyimonferencji> (10.07.2019).

⁵⁵ K. Zadarko, *Dziś Chrystus ma twarz uchodźcy*, on-line, <https://www.deon.pl/religia/wiara-i-spoleczenstwo/art,1049,dzis-chrystus-ma-twarz-uchodzcy.html> (10.07.2019).

⁵⁶ P. Stachowiak, *Kilka uwag o paradoksach polskiego katolicyzmu. Na marginesie narracji Kościoła katolickiego w Polsce o kwestii uchodźczej*, in: *Polityczne i społeczne aspekty wielokulturowości. Migracje i mniejszości*, ed. A. Adamczyk, A. Sakson, C. Trościak, UAM, Poznań 2016, p. 142.

⁵⁷ H. Hoser, *Uchodźcy – wezwanie do nawrócenia*, on-line, <https://ekai.pl/abp-henryk-hoser-w-rozmowie-z-kai-uchodzcy-wezwanie-do-nawrocenia/> (10.07.2019).

Interestingly, especially by traditional Catholics⁵⁸ and lower-level clergy involved in the life of the Church⁵⁹.

Bishops, aware of such views of their faithful, attempt to convince them to change their approach, and speak directly about the need for education and building an "opening culture". Chairman of the CEP Council for Migration, Tourism and Pilgrimage said in this context: "can you ask when the average Pole, especially from smaller towns, can meet a Muslim or even a representative of any other culture or religion? We need knowledge, and we must not induce fears and terror. We need to build a culture of openness, guided by the wisdom of the Gospel⁶⁰."

In parallel to the calls for the reception of refugees and migrants in Poland, bishops emphasize the need to eliminate the causes of refugee and migration, as well as to help people affected by wars or disasters, where they live⁶¹. This probably refers to the position of the government and the opinions of the majority of the society. In practice, numerous actions are taken to rebuild hospitals or schools in Syria, as well as to provide ongoing assistance, e.g. medical. On the part of the Church, organizations such as Caritas and the Church in Need are involved.

Conclusion

The article presents the current migratory situation of Poland. The country was presented both as a source of emigration, and a settlement location for ever growing number of immigrants. The first part of the present elaboration presents the scale and motives behind emigration from Poland, and then its consequences in both the individual and social dimensions. We also presented the teaching of the Polish Church on migration. The second part of the paper is devoted to the issue of immigration to Poland. We started by presenting the policy of the Polish regarding refugees and migrants coming to Poland, as well as the position of the Catholic Church in this regard. The reflection culminated in listing current data on immigrants in Poland and the reasons for their settling in this country. Based on the analyzes conducted, we was found that the policy of the Polish state is open mainly to newcomers from Eastern Europe, while in relation to the Middle East and Africa, the Polish government only offers assistance in temporary settlement of potential migrants. In turn, the Roman Catholic Church in Poland proclaims the need to be open to all people in need of help, although it notices the need to educate the public in this matter. The solutions adopted in Poland result in a mass influx of migrants from Eastern European countries, especially from Ukraine. A significant influx of employees from Belarus, Vietnam, India or Georgia is also noticeable. There are many signs that migration to Poland will increase.

Summary

Poland is associated primarily as a source of migration, but in recent years, the country has also become a place of settlement for refugees and migrants coming in particular from Eastern Europe. In this paper we first set out to present the current emigration from Poland, then presenting the influx of foreigners to the same country. We also presented the

⁵⁸ P. Stachowiak, *Kilka uwag o paradoksach polskiego katolicyzmu. Na marginesie narracji Kościoła katolickiego w Polsce o kwestii uchodźczej*, in: *Polityczne i społeczne aspekty wielokulturowości. Migracje i mniejszości*, ed. A. Adamczyk, A. Sakson, C. Trosiak, UAM, Poznań 2016, p. 139.

⁵⁹ Ibid, p. 144.

⁶⁰ K. Zadarko, *Nie zawiedzmy Chrystusa*, on-line, <https://ekai.pl/nie-zawiedzmy-chrystusa-bp-krzysztof-zadarko-w-rozmowie-z-kai-o-uchodzcach/> (10.07.2019).

⁶¹ P. Stachowiak, *Kilka uwag o paradoksach polskiego katolicyzmu. Na marginesie narracji Kościoła katolickiego w Polsce o kwestii uchodźczej*, in: *Polityczne i społeczne aspekty wielokulturowości. Migracje i mniejszości*, ed. A. Adamczyk, A. Sakson, C. Trosiak, UAM, Poznań 2016, p. 142.

consequences of emigration for Poland. Then we concentrated our analysis on the teaching of Church regarding emigrants, and in particular the care for their spiritual good. The second part of the article was devoted to immigration to Poland. The reflection ended with presentation of current data on the number of immigrants and the reasons for settling in Poland. We demonstrated the Polish state policy in this regard, to move on to the position of the Roman Catholic Church, as regards the acceptance of refugees and migrants. Based on the analyzes conducted, we found that the policy of the Polish state is open mainly to newcomers from Eastern Europe, while in relation to the Middle East and Africa, the Polish government only offers assistance in temporary settlement of potential migrants. In turn, the Roman Catholic Church in Poland proclaims the need to be open to all people in need of help, although it notices the need to educate the public in this matter. The solutions adopted in Poland result in a mass influx of migrants from Eastern European countries, especially from Ukraine.

Key words: Migration, Poland, Catholic Church, Polish state